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Religions in Transition: 
An Attempt at a Synthesis1
Any serious discussion about what religion is would probably be endless. Nowadays there is fairly general consensus that, certainly in the case of 
religion, it is methodologically incorrect to insist that for any x, one should be 
able to state what feature (or set of features) the x should possess by virtue of 
which one is entitled to call it x. Consequently, rather than begin an inquiry into 
what religion is by dening the phenomenon, it seems better to start in some less 
formal way. I will begin by conjecturing what an extra-terrestrial visitor to our 
planet might include in a report to his home base about the earthly phenomena 
that English-speaking human beings usually call ‘religion’.
 * Mark Sultana studied philosophy and theology at the University of Malta and obtained 
a Doctorate in Philosophy from the Pontical Gregorian University in Rome. He presently 
lectures in philosophy at the University of Malta. His research interests include philosophical 
theology, philosophical anthropology, and the philosophy of mind. He is also Director of the 
Pastoral Formation Institute and Chairperson of the think-tank Converse at Palazzo de Piro, 
Malta.
 1 is article is being published in memory of Rev. Prof. Peter Serracino Inglott (1936-2012). 
A good proportion of the material originated as a rst chapter of an intended publication, at 
undergraduate level, on the subject of the philosophy of religion, which was to have been co-
authored by Rev. Prof. Peter Serracino Inglott, who had lectured for many years on the subject, 
and by Rev. Mark Sultana who, since, has taken up a post in philosophical theology. e 
publication was sadly never completed. e chapter was subsequently developed into a paper by 
Rev. Mark Sultana. is paper, which is now being published, was delivered at a conference on 
the philosophy of religion, attended by a select working group, and held at All Hallows’ College, 
Dublin between the 16th and the 18th May 2012.
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Your Excellencies,
Several and very splendid are the buildings and spaces on earth that 
are dedicated to this X, whom many call God. ey range from a huge 
domed structure called Saint Peter’s in Rome where sober yet ecstatic 
liturgies are held ... to a magnicent complex in Mecca called the Al-
Masjid al-Harām or the Grand Mosque where we are used to seeing 
millions of pilgrims gathering for the Eid al-Fitr ... to the Ryongi 
temple in Kyoto where a stone rectangle evokes the idea of innite 
nothingness; within its enclosure one is immersed in the petried 
silence of a primitive sea. e contrasts between these buildings is 
immense: in the Ryongi temple, it is next to impossible not to allow 
dreaminess to take over one’s mind: the heart of the monastery is an 
imperturbable lake reecting a nonchalant sky. What a contrast to 
the multitudes milling about in Saint Peter’s, or Mecca, or even in 
Jerusalem. e contrast spills over into beliefs, liturgies and ascetical 
practices. Indeed, there are sometimes bitter and even bloody conicts 
about the ways of conceiving, let alone dealing with, X ...
... Despite the vehemence with which human beings di%er among 
themselves as to God’s favourite way of communicating with them, 
belief that in one way or another he does so is very widespread. Actually 
there are only 12% of humankind – although this amounts to some 
900 million – who declare that they are atheists. ere are more – 
about 20% of humankind, which comes up to some 1,200 million 
– who profess that they believe in some X that might be called ‘God’ 
but who claim that they are not ‘religious’. Being ‘religious’ is taken to 
imply, in addition to believing that God exists, also claiming to be in 
communication with him and with others who similarly communicate 
with him. Despite the apparently countless varieties of religion, if one 
were to carry out a complete survey of the manifestations of religion on 
earth, it is safe to speculate that it would result that that there are just 
two main types. e rst type developed in three main phases, Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, and holds that God communicates with human 
beings primarily through language. e second type, which developed 
through two main phases, Hinduism and Buddhism, holds that 
contact between the divinity and the human, or the eternal and the 
temporal, occurs primordially in silence. ey have been described in 
terms of transcendence and interiority; reference can also be made to 
the contrast between the ‘theistic’ and the ‘mystical’2 types of religion.
 2 I am using this term in a generic manner as Ninian Smart o(en used it (see, for instance, 
Religions in Transition: An Attempt at a Synthesis – Mark Sultana 57
... A much-controverted phenomenon called ‘secularisation’ has 
undoubtedly been taking place, at least in the European world. Even 
here, perhaps one should rather speak of the unchurching of Europe, 
and of religious individualization, than of secularisation. For it 
seems that, in so-called secular societies, people have developed a 
private religion not abandoned religion altogether. Religion has 
become invisible rather than non-existent. e emphasis has been 
switched to individualization of belief; the compilation of personal 
creeds that give meaning to one’s unique existence, according to 
one’s experiences, interests and aspirations. Hence, in contemporary 
Europe, religious identity is increasingly a matter of personal choice. 
Almost concurrently, however, in the nineteen eighties, in Iran, an 
Islamic revolution, spiritually guided by the Ayatollah Khomeini, 
replaced the Shah; in Poland, the Solidarity Movement led by Lech 
Wałesa – wearing a huge badge of the Virgin of Częstochowa on 
his lapel – began the process of toppling the Communist regimes 
that ruled over Eastern Europe; in the USA, Protestant evangelism, 
preached by televangelists remained a signicant electoral force; 
in Latin America, Catholicism preached a liberation theology that 
inspired millions; in Burma and elsewhere Buddhism remained 
enormously inuential on the social and cultural levels; the 
relationship between India and Pakistan is largely coloured by that 
between Hinduism and Islam. It is understandably exceedingly 
dicult to formulate a criterion in terms of which it would be 
possible to decide indubitably who should be counted as a religious 
person and who not. at, of course, has not prevented a fairly large 
group of philosophers, in the wake of psychologists, sociologists and 
other self-styled human scientists, from writing interminable series 
his Worldviews: Cross-cultural Explorations of Human Beliefs, 2nd ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cli"s, NJ 1995) although I am here applying it, even if somewhat controversially, to indicate one 
of two types of religion. While in theistic or prophetic religions, God is personal, creator and 
sovereign over the universe, communicates with humans and is personally concerned with the 
right ordering of creation and with the formation of ‘righteous’ relationships between Godself 
and humans and between humans themselves, the divinity of ‘Eastern’ religions is more of a 
principle than a person: it is the principle of stillness that is the source of all activity, the One 
from which all multiplicity proceeds. e latter is what is meant here by ‘mystical’. Here, “it is 
not that [‘Eastern’] asceticisms are, as is claimed, ignorant of divine transcendency and of the 
divine personality; they consider, nevertheless, that the latter is a ‘non-supreme’ aspect of the 
former, an aspect destined, in the last resort, to annul itself as such, when knowledge will rise to 
the non-duality of the Principle,” Jacques-Albert Cuttat, “e Religious Encounter of East and 
West,” ought, 33 (1958): 485-514, as quoted in Julius Evola, “On the Problem of the Meeting 
of Religions East and West¸” East and West 10 (1959): 270.
58 MELITA THEOLOGICA
of books, with each giving a dierent answer to the question. I have 
so far allowed myself to simply follow my hunches. I must admit 
that I did not "nd it easy even relying on intuition – rather than the 
principles of scienti"c investigation – to form a clear idea as to what 
is religious. For instance, many of the participants in the religious 
rituals of Japan appear outside it to live animated by hedonist 
ambitions and the rush to get rich quickly. In a Japanese newspaper 
there appeared a picture entitled: A Buddhist Requiem for Broken 
Telephones at the Zojo-ji Temple in Tokyo. It showed three Buddhist 
monks, attired with the proper sacred vestments and implements, 
celebrating a ritual upon a pile of broken telephones, in front of a 
large seated audience of men in Western dress who would "t in well 
in the boardrooms of corporate Japan.3
*  *  *
Let us now suppose that the text reproduced above has somehow fallen into 
your hands and you are asked by a Very Important Person on earth to give your 
opinion of it. e following might well be the result.
An assumption that cannot be made is that an E.T.’s perspective on the 
religions of the world should be taken as a necessarily perfect one, or as one 
incapable of being improved upon. e E.T. may well be able to enter successively 
and successfully into the very dierently sized and cobbled shoes of the almost 
in"nitely various believers, but this guarantees no exception to the rule that 
genuinely objective vision is unattainable for humans. So let us examine the 
question as to the best way of portraying religion. For, there is hardly any need 
to stress that the relation between the adherents of dierent religions are more 
aected by the images which each group has of the other than by the precise 
content of the beliefs held by the spiritual leaders of each religious group. It is, 
however, perhaps worth stressing that it is becoming increasingly impossible in 
the age of electronic communication for any authority to control the images of 
any religious group which anyone with the means of diusing them chooses to 
broadcast or stream. Given these two conditions, it becomes obviously important 
for all of us human beings but especially for those of us who are adherents of 
one or other of the "ve main world religions to be concerned about the ways in 
which religion is portrayed. Also, given the o(en muddled ways of portrayal, 
the immense plurality of world religions, and the tense relationships sometimes 
characterising their encounters, we need to urgently propose anew such questions 
as: how is a real encounter possible given this diversity? What kind of unity can 
there be? On what basis could we even begin to search for such unity?
 3 See Ninian Smart, e World’s Religions, (Englewood Cli"s, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 465.
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In exploring dierent pictures or portrayals of religion, it is possible to 
distinguish three main styles – if one wants to parody slightly the historians 
of art – corresponding perhaps to the three main phases of development of 
philosophical attitudes – in the portrayal of religions. e suggestion will be 
that there is something to learn from each of them for the purpose of hopefully 
constructing a fourth approach.
i. To begin with, before the Cartesian Age, the predominant attitude seems to 
have been for the adherents of each religion to hold that the truest portrait 
not only of their own but also of the religions of the others could only be given 
from the standpoint of their own. us, in the Middle Ages, Christianity and 
Islam would appear, in the eyes of a Jew, as misapprehensions of the Torah; 
Judaism, in the eyes of a Christian, would appear to be an anachronism and 
Islam a heresy; both Judaism and Christianity, in the eyes of a Moslem, 
seemed to be polluted versions of the divine revelation restored to its pristine 
purity in Islam. e relationship between religions is here seen in terms of 
proclamation, missionary activity and conversion.
 However, reection on the concept of truth has led later – especially 
contemporary – philosophers to a, perhaps, unexpectedly general agreement 
that it – truth – only arises in a dialogic context. Hence, although there may 
be some point in certain contexts to the mere portrayal of other religions 
from the point of view of one’s own, it is not an exercise conducive to the 
dialogue in the context of which truth shines out. at was not, of course, 
the reason for the change of fashion in the style of portraiture of religions 
which took place with the waning of the Middle Ages.
ii. e second phase in the history of the portraiture of religions – which is 
here being outlined in a somewhat tongue-in-cheek way – began, at least 
in the West, with the Cartesian Age. e attitude then spread that the best 
account – or the most accurate portrait – of a religion would be that given by 
a liberal-rationalistic standpoint. is view went swimmingly with the post-
Cartesian view prevalent throughout the course of modern philosophy that 
the only sure starting point of knowledge was self-knowledge on rational 
grounds. Scholarship here was based on a standpoint supposedly above and 
beyond the religious phenomenon. e dream was to evaluate the various 
religions using the neutrality of enlightened reason. is led to a transition 
in interest from philosophical theology to the philosophy of religion. e 
aim was to seek to separate the rational core of religion – now understood 
mainly in terms of some kind of deism and of morality – from the emotional 
and superuous husk – which had to do with liturgies and rituals, revelation 
and providence, prayer and worship. is kind of portrait, of course, severely 
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delimited the phenomenon of religion. Again, however, such truncation was 
not the primary reason for the shi! in the kind of portrait of religion which 
took place towards the middle of the nineteenth century.
iii. e second view began to lose its popularity with the beginning of the 
contemporary view. en the ‘masters of suspicion’ – as Paul Ricoeur 
famously called Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud – convinced many, in the West 
at least, that there is much which is irrational in our beliefs and actions and 
that others might be able to understand our deep convictions better than 
ourselves. In congruence with this view of the self, many philosophers of 
religion came to think that truer accounts of religion could be given by non-
adherents, whose penetrating minds had acquired the various new analytic 
skills that allowed them to pierce beneath the surface consciousness of the 
mass of religious believers.
 One suspects that there is hardly anyone today who subscribes to any of the 
theories of the ‘masters of suspicion’ in toto. On the other hand, it is dicult 
not to agree that adopting a hint or two from them can improve the quality 
of our exercise of the cra! of the portrayal of religions, as it has improved that 
of all art criticism when practised judiciously. If we stuck to just the portraits 
of a religion given by its own adherents or if we accepted such portraits at 
face value, the result would be just as vast an impoverishment and distortion 
of our knowledge as if we only allowed autobiographies to be written and 
did not countenance any other sort of biographical work. In addition, it is 
nowadays largely agreed that there is no neutral rational standpoint.
 However, the belief that the self, at least as conceived a!er Descartes, does 
not exist at all also gained sway. is belief, together with the renunciation of 
meta-narratives, the embracing of perspectivism, and the portrayed weakness 
of reason, is o!en taken to be, if not the corollary of totally consistent 
atheism, the seedbed for at least a vague form of agnosticism. Perhaps the best 
description of this state is the expression, coined by the British sociologist 
Grace Davie: believing without belonging.4 is means that an increasing 
gap has grown between religious believing and belonging: while people 
are apparently increasingly concerned to nurture the spiritual dimension 
of life, and nd answers to questions of meaning in life, they progressively 
seem to see organised religion in the form of the institutional church as 
being irrelevant to those issues. But this should not blind us to the fact that 
we are in a new age of religious searching. It is a time of belief for many, a 
 4 See Grace Davie, Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), passim.
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time of unbelief for some and a time of novel ontic commitments, albeit 
not religious ones and perhaps including play, mystery, and even horror, for 
others.5 While morality may seem to be a mere matter of creative freedom 
and it may be hard to see it should be grounded in something higher – such 
as divine transcendence – religious answers to the question of life’s meaning 
are still available, and, in a number of signicant occasions in the person’s 
life, such answers are desirable.6 Perhaps one should speak of a decline, not 
of religious aspiration and its urgency, but rather of the very possibility of 
unchallengeable beliefs.7 Despite the loss implicit in such a decline, one must 
also say that postmodernism has clearly contributed a lot to the development 
of skill in constructive and multi-dimensional portraiture.
At this point, it seems that there are three ways forward for an encounter 
between religions: the tendency to simply give up the endless dispute about truth 
and recognize that what is at the core of religion is orthopraxy delineated in the 
service one ought to give to peace, justice and the stewardship of creation; the 
tendency of theistic religions to dissolve and annihilate themselves in pursuing 
a ‘mystical’ path; or the tendency of ‘mystical’ traditions to trace forth their 
relationships with theistic religions.
Perhaps it is the rst and the second routes which are the more beguiling. 
We can start by granting some attention to the rst alternative: the ‘pragmatic’ 
route. e call is for religions to give up all disputes about truth and aim together 
for the betterment of humanity in whatever the situation could demand of 
them. ere is much which is laudable here: questions of peace, justice and the 
respect towards creation are of great importance. Undoubtedly religions have 
much to contribute towards such vitally important aims. Here there have been 
noteworthy attempts to strive towards world peace in a context of interreligious 
ethical understanding and cooperation like the ‘Global Ethic Project’ and the 
‘Parliament of the World Religions.’ However, one must also say that religions 
cannot be reduced to morality or to political purposes. Religions are constituted 
by more than moral injunctions; they have to do with beliefs, emotions, 
revelations, rituals, practices, prayers and o"erings. Indeed, it would be simplistic 
to expect a priori religiously-neutral solutions to situations of lack of peace and 
justice. e personal formation and transformation associated with religions 
is a vital and ever-new aspect making hope possible – there are no procedural 
shortcuts to peace, social justice or the respect for the integrity of creation.
 5 See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2007), 374-376.
 6 See ibid., 591-592.
 7 See ibid., 530.
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 en, what about the ‘mystical’ model? At a time when we are very doubtful 
whether we can know the transcendent at all and we are very uneasy about claims 
of intolerance when any truth-claims regarding the transcendent are made, it 
appears that the future should belong to ‘mystical’ religions. Here, no claims 
are made about the divine; there is no emphasis on the institutional or sacral 
features of religion, and all con"ict with scienti#c reason is excluded. Religion 
is to be found entirely in the realm of ‘mystical’ experience; hence, it is tolerant 
and allows the human person an unfettering of her #nitude. Here, one certainly 
#nds an excellence: we are united in our inward search in that, leaving our very 
‘I’ behind, we come into contact with the ine$able and are transformed and 
dissolved in such a way that we engage with and view the world serenely, and 
without attachments. ere is much which is great here: this is the greatness of 
the ‘mystical’ religions. ere is certainly also much that is common here; and 
much that could serve to deepen the theistic religions. Indeed, theistic religions 
have always had a strong apophatic dimension.8
At this point, reference could be made to the remarkable book by Nicholas of 
Cusa, De Pace Fidei, in which a heavenly council of religions is summoned by the 
Logos to serve peace. In this meeting, in which seventeen representatives from 
various religions and nations are summoned, the Logos, referring to the teachings 
of wisdom, says “You will not #nd another faith, but rather one and the same 
single religion presupposed everywhere … As in#nite [God] is neither three, nor 
one, nor anything that can be stated. e names which are attributed to God are 
taken from creatures, since He Himself is ine$able in Himself and is above all 
that can be named or stated”.9
However, while ‘mystical’ and theistic religions may have much in common – 
indeed, more than one could think – one must also take note of irreducible elements 
in theism: the cosmos seen as created; history as pregnant with God’s presence and 
providence; the believer as related to God; worship of God as transformation of 
the believer in such a way that she is given back to herself in mission. However 
important the apophatic element may be, it does not exhaust the theistic religious 
experience. In addition, a complete apophaticism would mean that there could 
never be any community of thought and will; there could never be a point, beyond 
our individual selves, to our thinking and acting.  e religious search would 
become a matter of individual therapy where one does not – and indeed cannot – 
reach out towards states of a$airs outside oneself or towards others.
 8 See the formulation of the Fourth Lateran Council in DS 806: “between Creator and 
creature no similitude can be expressed without implying an even great dissimilitude”.
 9 Nicholas of Cusa, De Pace Fidei, iv and vii, translated by William F. Wertz, accessed 29 
October 2012,  http://www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/cusa_p_of_f.html.
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Now, the point of the regrettably clumsy and cursory remarks of potted 
history uttered earlier was to lead up to a serious and sincere plea for a fourth 
kind of approach to the portrayal of religions.
For instance, it is natural that a rst look at the great, living world religions 
yields the impression that there is a big divide between the theistic or prophetic, 
and the ‘mystical’ religions, but it may well turn out that a second look will reveal 
that it is quite logical to consider the ‘mystical’ as being a tendential emphasis 
upon one side or dimension of theistic religion – its ‘experiential’ aspect – or 
even a hyperbolization of this aspect.
Indeed, if the theistic religions are right in holding that language is indeed 
the medium of communication between God and humankind, then, it is almost 
inevitable that the nature of the relationships will be three-dimensional. is 
observation is not at all surprising, since they are characteristic of the linguistic 
animal as such and there is, on that basis, a close anity between ethics, politics 
and religion. Moreover, even a summary genealogical tracing of the development 
of the characterisation of religion by anthropologists will yield a gradual, 
progressive emergence of the recognition of just these three dimensions of 
religion. In this light, it might be said that if the E.T. were to submit a revised or 
improved version of the report, she would say – rather than that there were two 
main types of religion – that religion, looked at holistically, had three aspects – 
corresponding to the three dimensions of language – institutional, referential, 
and experiential.
i. Firstly, we have the ‘Experimental and Mystical Side’: the world of action 
and suering, of interiorised, personally appropriated experience and 
responsibility that serves to integrate the elements of ‘thought’ and ‘fact’. 
is dimension recognizes that human beings are never totally passive 
or contemplative. It acknowledges that humans are irreducibly wilful 
creatures and that this ‘active’ aspect of their being colours and shapes their 
contemplative attitude towards reality so that their thoughts are moulded 
by elements of interiorised and appropriated action.10 Indeed, long before 
William James made the claim that the essence of religion was a specic form 
of experience (that of the twice-born),11 one of the relatively early attempts 
at nding the essence of religion claimed that there was a specic form of 
experience, only authentically found in primitive man, and which was the 
 10 For a more extensive exposition of these three elements – which were famously discussed by 
Friedrich von Hügel in the second chapter of his e Mystical Element of Religion – see Nicholas 
Lash, Easter in Ordinary (London: SCM Press, 1988), 154-162.
 11 See William James, e Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New 
York: e Modern Library, 1902).
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source of religion. e anthropologist Levy-Bruhl maintained that although 
primitive man was potentially capable of logical reasoning, his particular 
psychological state in the world was rather like that of an infant who lacks 
the experience which results, above all, in the ability to distinguish one thing 
from another. Hence, according to Levy-Bruhl, primitive man lived in a state 
which could be termed ‘participation mystique’ i.e. a communion between 
all beings – expressed by the totem – which he feels to be ‘divine’, but which 
he lacks the ability to conceptualize and verbalize. us, it exists only as an 
a"ective state or feeling. Also, because his self-consciousness is not highly 
individualized, he pictures death, for instance, not as a total destruction, 
but as a change of place. e foundation or ground of the experience of 
communion is worshipped as God.12
ii. In addition, since no language can function without its having a system of 
reference to the world, as Gottlob Frege and Michael Dummett have also 
most perspicuously shown, then any religion that claims to be rooted in 
divine-human linguistic transactions must have a thought-content just 
as any single sentence of any language. is dimension acknowledges the 
questioning, reasoning, argumentative, abstractive, inquisitive, analytical 
and dialectical sides of the human mind. It recognizes that there is a nexus 
between intelligent activity and the intelligibility of the world; that there are 
minds only because the world is understandable; that the real is somehow 
rational. Indeed, one of the best-known – and earliest – attempts at #nding 
the essence of religion by studying primitive beliefs was made by Tylor. He 
held that the essence of religion was Animism, i.e., the belief that there 
existed a ‘soul’ as the invisible principle of activity in all things. According to 
Tylor, the source of this belief was the individual’s experience of dreaming. 
In dreams, the individual experiences a kind of shadowy double of himself 
coming into being, leading a life of its own, replete with fantastic adventures. 
us, the idea of a ‘soul’ with its own life independent of the body comes 
about. is ‘soul’ is then thought to go living on, even aer death and the 
corruption of the body. If the souls of the dead remain active, then it is only 
reasonable to entertain a fearful respect of them and to seek to keep them 
friendly by, for instance o"ering them gis. All things are then, by analogical 
 12 See Lucien Lévy-Brühl, Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (Paris: F. Alcan, 
1910), translated as How Natives ink (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1926); La mentalité primitive 
(Paris: F. Alcan, 1922), translated as Primitive Mentality (London: Allen & Unwin, 1923); 
L’âme primitive (Paris: F. Alcan, 1927), translated as e “Soul” of the Primitive (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1928); Le surnaturel et la nature dans la mentalité primitive (Paris: F. Alcan, 1931), 
translated as Primitives and the Supernatural (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1935).
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extension, imagined to have ‘souls’; hence, we have, for instance, the souls 
of the sun, the moon, and the earth and they are held to be responsible 
for such natural phenomena as rain and fertility. ese larger-than-human 
souls are called ‘gods’. Finally, the multiplicity of gods is reduced to unity 
by the attribution of supremacy to One Supreme God, identied either 
with the life-principle of the tribe or with some natural entity, such as the 
Sun, represented by the tribal chief or king. e point which appears to be 
valuable in Tylor’s account is that it stresses what seems to be a universal 
human aspiration – that is, to be in contact with some larger, fuller, more 
signicant life than the humdrum one of ordinary existence.13 is, as Erik 
Erikson has shown, is the way in which an ‘identity’ is established, through 
both receiving (benets) from, and giving (sacrice) to, the larger reality. 
Nevertheless, critics have stressed that, in the rst place, no very clear account 
is given of what is meant by ‘spiritual’ or ‘supernatural’ beings (souls or gods); 
many religions, such as Buddhism, treat ‘supernatural powers’ as impersonal 
(equally non-animistic is the ‘mana’ which Durkheim emphasised as the 
essence of totemic religions). In the second place, Tylor’s account appears to 
focus too much on the individual and his beliefs and too little on the social 
reality which comes ‘nally’ into his picture.
iii. Indeed, since as Ludwig Wittgenstein has most perspicuously shown, there 
cannot be a ‘private’ language; there must be an institutional dimension, rich 
in conventional elements, such as rituals and governance structures, all subject 
to historical development and change. is dimension can be described 
further as the tradition-respecting dimension: realizing that one must build 
on the lessons of the past, recognizing as authoritative the judgments of the 
experts, and acknowledging the need for some system of governance for 
human society to exist. is aspect is well brought out by the attempt made 
at identifying the essence of religion by the sociologist Emile Durkheim in 
his famous book e Elementary Forms of Religion.14 Durkheim found it in 
totemism i.e. the cult of an object which represents the embodiment of an 
impersonal force called ‘mana’, which is society itself. In Durkheim’s view, 
it is social life which accounts for all that raises the human being above the 
other animals and, in particular, for rational activity. e role of religion is 
 13 See Ivan Strenski, “e Shock of the ‘Savage’: Edward Burnett Tylor, Evolution, and Spirits,” 
in inking About Religion: An Historical Introduction to eories of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2006), 91-116.
 14 Emile Durkheim, e Elementary Forms of Religion (New York: Free Press, 1965). See also 
Robert N. Bellah, ed., Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society (Chicago, Ill.: University of 
Chicago Press, 1973).
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the strengthening of the social links between humans, since society depends 
on the obedient !delity of its members to its uni!ed control structures, and 
this !delity is maintained by reference to the sacred (Mircea Eliade tells of 
a tribe of Australian aborigines, the Achilpa, which lost the cult-object that 
was their contact with the gods – their response was simply to lie down and 
die). Durkheim thus stresses the institutional and ritual aspects of religion, 
its social rather than its ‘belief ’ side. He de!nes religion as “a uni!ed system 
of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things [i.e. things set apart, and 
contact with which is ordinarily forbidden] … which unite all those who 
accept them into one single moral community [or church]”. Critics have 
pointed out that “uni!ed system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred 
things” is a de!nition which applies to magic just as much as to religion. 
In any case, Durkheim seems to think that mass ceremonies are what there 
essentially is to institutional religions. Robertson-Smith, Radcli"e-Brown 
and Talcott Parsons are among the famous anthropologists and sociologists 
who, like Durkheim, have emphasised the social dimension of religion above 
all others.
ere have subsequently been various accounts that attempted to unify these 
three dimensions of religion. Despite the fact that Friedrich von Hügel was self-
taught and apt to wander like an unbridled horse across !elds that academic 
specialists would have liked to keep segregated, his is one of the clearest analyses 
of the phenomenon of religion. He sets out a tripartite schema which is meant to 
apply, not solely to primitive, but to all kinds of religion. His scheme (set out in 
his book e Mystical Element in Religion15) clearly distinguishes three elements:
a.  the ‘intellectual’ (or ‘mythical’): dogmas and beliefs, theology and 
philosophy;
b.  the ‘institutional’ (or ‘social’): speci!c rituals and organisational 
structures;
c.  the ‘mystical’ (or ‘vital’): special experiences and ascetical practices.
Indeed, if other attempts at identifying the basic components of religion are 
studied, it will be found that, while many appear to understate one or another of 
the elements, they fall readily into von Hügel’s tripartite scheme. For example, the 
philosopher Henri Bergson distinguished the ‘social’ (closed, static, stabilising) 
from the ‘mystical’ (open, dynamic, intuitive). e sociologist Roger Bastide 
 15 Friedrich von Hügel, e Mystical Element in Religion (London: Dent, 1923). See also 
Joseph P. Whelan, Spirituality of von Hügel (London: Collins, 1971); Michael de la Bédoyère, 
e Life of Baron von Hügel (London: Dent, 1951); James J. Kelly, Baron Friedrich von Hügel’s 
Philosophy of Religion (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983).
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distinguished the ‘representational’ (the intellectual) from the ‘motivational’ (the 
ritual, part of the institutional). e theologian Antonin-Gilbert Sertillanges 
distinguished the ‘dogmatic’ from the ‘governmental’ and the ‘sacramental’.
What can this tell us about the relationship between religions in transition. 
What kind of meeting-point could be found? And what could Christianity’s 
position be in the dialogue between religions? 
One great contribution of Christianity is certainly the question of truth: a 
most fecund meeting-point of faith and reason. Christianity holds that God is 
truth and is the source of whatever truth is present in reality, and makes possible 
whatever truth is present in our utterances. is assertion oen appears alarming 
in that it seems necessarily intolerant. e contemporary person will probably 
opine that beneath varying forms all religions are in essence the same: each 
person has his beliefs which will simply lead him to the unknowable God. e 
proposition that God is truth is also a statement that appears to emphasise the 
immense gulf present between Christianity and the ‘mystical’ types of religion. 
Although God is ultimately ineable, allowing oneself to be addressed and 
called forth by the Triune God is signi"cantly dierent from letting oneself 
sink and disappear into the silent depths of Being. Even so, both in the case of 
human persons and, particularly, in the case of God, we know far more about 
what ‘person’ is not than what the word means positively – this is an observation 
which brings to mind again the remarkable words by Nicholas of Cusa.
Here, in conclusion, two interrelated points could be made which touch both 
the quest for a possible meeting-point between religions and the question of the 
role of the Christian believer in the dialogue between religions.
First of all, the mystical and apophatic dimension of the dierent religions 
should be ever-present. Here it is interesting that Socrates, in the Apology and in 
the Crito pointed to the connection between truth and poverty: “I believe I can 
produce a satisfactory witness for the truth of what I say, namely my poverty”.16 
Commitment to ‘God’ brings Socrates neither prestige nor possessions but rather 
poverty and ridicule. Poverty is the truly divine manifestation of a pilgrimage for 
truth. Here, it would be important to note that even dogmas in Christianity 
– like Trinitarian eology and Christology – are an invitation to an innite 
journey towards God who is always innitely greater. ey are ‘speech’, but they 
simultaneously serve to preserve the ever-greater pregnant mystery and innity 
who is God.
Secondly, perhaps the goal of a synthesis of religions is a misplaced one and not 
even a desirable one. Perhaps, rather than trying to bring all religions together, one 
 16 Crito 48c-d.
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should pray ardently for the unication of humankind in the love for the same 
God.17 is is not a renunciation of truth nor is it mere pragmatism. It is not a 
dispensation from the need to search for truth nor is it an assertion denying that 
truth could be articulated at all. It is rather an attitude of respect and a humility 
that seeks to appreciate that which is deeper purifying truth even in that which 
is strange and foreign. It has to do with allowing one’s narrow understanding of 
truth to be loosened to allow oneself to be on a pilgrimage towards God who is 
ever-greater. It also has to do with allowing one’s religion to be puried by the 
truth that shows itself in religions and reveals itself in dialogue – dialogue, aer 
all, aims at truth, where we are companions in this vital search. Here, one stands 
to learn much even from the detractors of religion like the masters of suspicion. 
Much of what they say is not too dissimilar to the criticism of the sickness in 
religion expressed by Old Testament prophets. Finally, it has to do with the 
profound recognition that, in the world of religions, we are always encountering 
persons who are somehow in search for the hidden depth who is God. No one 
is saying anything which is utterly unknown to others; no one is saying anything 
which is utterly grasped by oneself. We do proclaim yes – otherwise we would 
be trivialising our very search and conviction – but we proclaim in dialogue 
where the one who proclaims is also a receiver. We are, aer all, all pilgrims (who 
follow a personal religious journey) and converts (who responsibly take decisions 
regarding the religion which we profess).18 
Perhaps the heavenly vision which Nicholas of Cusa describes and hopes for 
could become real in a process where “the dialogue of religions become[s] more 
and more a listening of the Logos, who is pointing out to us, in the midst of our 
separation and our contradictory a!rmations, the unity we already share”.19
 17 See Jacques A. Cuttat, Begegnung der Religion (Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1956), 84, as 
quoted in Joseph Ratzinger, “e Dialogue of the Religions,” in Many Religions – One Covenant 
(San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1998), 102.
 18 See Danièle Hervieu-Léger, “e Role of Religion in Establishing Social Cohesion,” in 
Conditions of European Solidarity, ed. Krzysztof Michalski (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2006), 2: 45-63, passim.
 19 Ratzinger, “Dialogue of the Religions,” 113.
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